An arbitrator's primary duty remains the delivery of an accurate award, resting on a reasonably ascertainable picture of reality. Litigants wanting only quick or cheap solutions can roll dice, and have no need of lawyers. Evidentiary tools in arbitration should balance sensitivity towards cost and delay against the parties' interest in due process and correct decisions. If arbitration loses its moorings as a truth-seeking process, nostalgia for a golden age of simplicity will yield to a clarion call for reinvention of an adjudicatory process aimed at discovering what happened, finding relevant legal norms and properly construing contract language. Though not so jealous as to exclude all rivals, truth does insist on being first among equals.
A View from the Hilltop
Often called the first European novel, Don Quijote de la Mancha weaves together the idealistic quests of a slightly delusional Spanish gentleman who saw himself as a knight errant long after the age of chivalry had ended. A Moorish enchanter had recorded the Don's adventures, defeats and victories. At one point in the story, the Don objects to narratives of his defeats, arguing that heroes deserve praise, not scorn. After all, he adds, Virgil embellished the piety of Aeneas just as Homer enhanced the wisdom of Odysseus. In response, a young scholar suggests two different ways to view the world. A poet can say things as they ought to have been, whereas the historian must write things as they were. 1 Like historians, arbitrators normally focus on things as they were, seeking the most reliable account of the controverted events giving rise to the claims. In deciding disputes accurately, arbitrators promote the type of promise-keeping that underpins the positive economic teamwork that marries public and private welfare.
Often underrated or misjudged, truth has dispatched more than one mind beneath the intellectual storm waves of a giant analytic sea, and anyone venturing to explore its contours must do so with fear and trembling.
2 Yet truth-seeking lies at the core of what arbitration is about, and cannot long be avoided in any serious discussion of the subject.
Several levels of inquiry present themselves. A panoramic perspective from 6,000 meters (20,000 feet for American alpinists) might examine reality in an abstract way. With varying degrees of sincerity, thinkers since antiquity have asked, 'What is truth?' 3 By contrast, lawyers in the litigation trenches consider ways that rival versions of truth influence the judges, juries and arbitrators who decide cases. This vista includes the art of advocacy and tools to persuade decision-makers that one view of the case has more merit than another. In the common law tradition such communications implicate rules of evidence intended, albeit in part, to enhance the prospect of reaching a correct conclusion.
Finally, a view from the hilltop (somewhere between the trenches and the Alpine peaks) looks at how goals other than truth-seeking enter the equation. Examining documents and listening to witness testimony will cost time and money. At some point, the additional enlightenment to be gleaned from more information will be offset by the value of finality and economy. The present essay explores this last line of inquiry, looking at how truth-seeking balances against sensitivity to speed and economy in arbitration.
Accuracy in arbitration means something other than absolute truth as it might exist in the eyes of an omniscient God. In examining the competing views of reality proposed by each side, arbitrators aim to get as near as reasonably possible to a correct picture of those disputed events, words, and legal norms that bear consequences for the litigants' claims and defences. They recognize that some answers are better than others, even if perfection proves elusive.
Such truth-seeking relies principally on documents, human recollection, and expert opinion. For complex commercial and investment cases, the process does not necessarily come quickly or cheaply. Of all the goals that compete with adjudicatory truth-seeking, few have been more challenging than speed and economy. Indeed, time and cost often appear as the enemy, interfering with efficient arbitration.
On more mature reflection, however, time may prove the friend and patron of good arbitration rather than its enemy. 5 Although justice delayed can mean justice denied, a sense that truth matters remains vital to a perception that justice is being done. Arbitration becomes a lottery of inconsistent and unpredictable results without some investment of the time and money required for a rigorous search for facts and law in which litigants receive a meaningful opportunity to present their cases. Success in arbitration is not measured by a stop watch alone.
Much of the criticism of arbitration's cost and delay thus tells only half the story, often with subtexts portending a cure worse than the disease. An arbitrator's main duty lies not in dictating a peace treaty, but in delivery of an accurate award that rests on a reasonable view of what happened and what the law says. Finding that reality in a fair manner does not always run quickly or smoothly.
Although good case management values speed and economy, it does so with respect for the parties' interest in correct decisions. The parties have no less interest in correct decisions than in efficient proceedings. 6 An arbitrator who makes the effort to listen before deciding will enhance both the prospect of accuracy and satisfaction of the litigants' taste for fairness. In the long run, little satisfaction will come from awards that are quick and cheap at the price of being systematically wrong.
To fulfil its promise of enhancing economic cooperation, arbitration must aim at an optimum counterpoise between truth-seeing and efficiency. Just as a restaurant can fail to provide an agreeable dining experience either by serving bad food or by making customers wait too long for their meal, arbitrators fall short of their duty by neglecting procedures that promote correct awards, just as much as by failing to calibrate the expenditure of time and money.
If arbitration loses its moorings as a truth-seeking process, nostalgia for a cheerful golden age of quick results will yield to calls for reinvention of an adjudicatory process aimed at actually getting the facts and the law. Though not so jealous as to exclude all rivals, truth does insist on remaining first among equals, as the principal objective of the arbitral process.
Rivals of Award Accuracy
A. An Era of Disenchantment On a small street in downtown Boston stands a shoe repair shop with a proactive approach to customer complaints. In the window, an equilateral triangle links three options: fast service, low price, high quality. 'Pick any two', patrons are advised.
The price of such trade-offs may be missing from much of the current nostalgia for a bygone golden age of cheap and cheerful arbitration. Much is said about the business community's disenchantment with arbitration. 7 The critics devote less energy grappling with how to achieve efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, or addressing the dissatisfaction that would follow a shift away from truth-seeking as arbitration's principal aim. It has become commonplace to lamenting that the arbitral process now resembles the inheritance dispute satirized in Bleak House, described as 'so complicated that no man alive knows what it means'. 8 Reportedly, some lawyers call international a 'monster,' 9 while others ridicule detailed rules. 10 A 'scorched earth' policy is said to taint many proceedings.
11 Commentators urge a model The dark side [of arbitration's evolution] is that we are sacrificing the main goal of arbitration-which has always been intended as a resolution of disputes.' Mr Carter commented that many users of arbitration are 'always operating on the basis of the last bad thing that happened to them'. Ibid, 635.
8 Charles Dickens, Bleak House (1853). Litigation costs in Jarndyce v Jarndyce ultimately consumed the entire estate, with despair causing one legatee to blow his brains out at a Chancery Lane coffee house, while another expired in hopeless dejection. The court refused to vacate the award, finding the arbitrators to have inherent power to sanction bad behavior, notwithstanding that the contract explicitly required each party to ear its own attorneys' fees.
arbitration's contractual nature invites procedural innovation aimed at reconciling truth-seeking with other litigation goals such as efficiency.
Some critiques, however, travel with a subtext that downgrades the type of truth-seeking that has long served to promote both predictability and fairness in economic relationships. One camp of commentators posits that commercial litigants seek principally an end to hostilities so they can get on with their business. A recent listing of arbitral virtues omits any mention of correct awards, 32 while other commentaries seem to down-play the need for arbitrator access to information. 33 The story runs that the parties want not so much an accurate decision, but simply a decision, full stop, made by someone who dictates a peace treaty rather than pronounces the true state of the world. 34 To test the hypothesis that peace-making is what litigants want, one might imagine a corporate counsel telling her boss how a joint venture partner has breached its agreement, resulting in a hundred million Euros in lost profits. ' We have a good case on the law and the facts,' she says. Moreover, she suspects that board minutes of the joint venture entity (now controlled by the other side) prove manipulation of that company's trading practices.
When arbitration claims are filed, the proceedings went forward with great speed. The tribunal denied most pre-trial information exchange, including the joint venture's minute book. Apparently the arbitrators had heard the general counsel give a speech about the downside of too much information. The arbitrators spent their deliberations cracking jokes and playing video games, rather than studying testimony and legal authorities. The award rejected recovery and bid everyone good luck in the future.
A career adjustment for the general counsel soon followed. It seems that her boss did not want an end to hostilities at the expense of defeat, at last not when the company has a good case. 35 The rougher form of justice might do if the case were less certain. 32 See eg, Jean-Claude Najar (n 20). After cataloguing the perceived defects of international arbitration today, the author concludes, 'By whatever means necessary, arbitration needs to be repaired, to be returned to its simple foundations-speed, cost efficiency, and user-friendliness'. In his introduction, Mr Najar defines the 'purpose' of international arbitration as 'cost efficiency, speed, and user-friendliness'. Reference to a factually accurate or legally correct award seems notably absent from the catalogue of arbitration's objectives or goals. At one arbitration symposium, a speaker garnered considerable applause by declaring that what in-house counsel want is simply for arbitrators 'to impose a solution that will get the parties out of their mess', full stop. The Search for Truth in Arbitration, Swiss Arbitration Symposium, Zü rich, February 2009. 33 See discussion of 'think slicing' in Thomas J Stipanowich, 'Arbitration: The New Litigation' (2010) 1 U Ill L Rev at 27-38. 34 See discussion above of Swiss Arbitration Association proceedings of 6 February 2009. For a thoughtful consideration of the contrast between truth-seeking and peace-making, see generally, Mirjan R Damaška, 'The Faces of Justice and State Authority' (1986) at 122-3, suggesting that a legal process aimed at maximizing dispute resolution as such cannot simultaneously aspire to maximize accurate fact-finding. 35 Indeed, one constant of international arbitration practice lies in the basic profile of individuals sought-after as arbitrators, which inevitably focuses on intelligence and integrity, both of which matter significantly if truth-seeking remains the goal. Never has a lawyer called the author to ask for recommendation of arbitrators who were dullards unable to look past smoke and mirrors designed to hide poor arguments and weak positions.
Like humanity in general, lawyers react against their last bad experience, forgetting the specters of other unattractive alternatives. On some occasions counsel chafe that victory escaped them because arbitrators refused to order production of that extra document that would have provided the critical evidence. At other times, lawyers fulminate against the injustice and burden of having to scour their files for irrelevant pieces of paper.
36
In this connection, one irony of the current debate is that the same lips that complain of legalized arbitration often lament aberrational or 'split the difference' awards, 37 reminiscent of King Solomon's interim ruling between the proverbial Jerusalem mothers.
38 Some literature even suggests that arbitrators make unprincipled decisions to attract business, 39 although no empirical data based on either 'win rates' 40 or size of damages 41 supports such conclusions.
C. The Arbitrator's Mission
No one should be surprised that arbitration implicates goals other than accuracy, or that these aims require limits on testimony and discovery requests. Nothing new resides in balancing truth-seeking against values that further 36 Likewise, a winning award might be upset by a court challenge, causing the victor's counsel to lament the lack of finality in arbitration. In another case, a disappointing award might be met with realization that full appeal on the legal merits does not generally exist in arbitration. In non-civil rights disputes, higher paid employees (earning over $60,000 per year) generally prevailed at greater rates (64%) in arbitration than in state court (56%). For lower paid employees the win rate was $39%. However, the size of the mean award was greater in court cases, at $462 thousand for courts compared with $211 for higher paid employees in arbitration and $$30 thousand for lower paid employees in arbitration. Looking to the median (rather than mean) award, the higher paid employees actually received more in arbitration ($94 thousand) than in court litigation ($68 thousand). public goals rather than adjudicatory precision. Classic trade-offs include professional secrecy, evidentiary exclusion rules, and the civil jury system. 42 What remains at stake in the debate are the shades of gray in balancing truth-seeking against added time and expense. Any account of international arbitration remains inadequate if it denigrates the aspiration to accuracy, or shifts an arbitrator's aim from a correct award to splitting the baby or dictating quick peace treaties.
Particularly for international transactions, arbitration often justifies itself by reference to a more level playing fields, not speed and economy. 43 In a stubbornly heterogeneous world lacking a supra-national judiciary with mandatory jurisdiction, arbitration enhances a relative measure of adjudicatory neutrality, which in turn promotes respect for shared ex ante expectations at the time of a contract or investment. 44 A desire for confidentiality and expertise also play a role, as do apprehensions about xenophobia 45 and civil juries.
46
Litigants are obviously free to choose a mode of dispute resolution that ignores accuracy based on recourse to testimony and documents. They may draw straws, flip coins, roll dice, fight a duel or consult entrails of a disemboweled chicken. If not inclined toward augury, chance or combat, the parties can give someone a blank check to decide 'in equity' without reference to law. No lawyers are needed, whether external or in-house.
Litigants might also take responsibility for their own fate by agreeing to settle. Mediation can facilitate settlement, particularly if arbitral or judicial backstops supply baselines from which to evaluate each side's positions. Yet 42 A perceived lack of reliability in the American jury system lies behind much of the domestic arbitration movement in the United States. Legal trustworthiness, however, may not be a jury's main goal. One classic commentary on American society suggests that the function of the civil jury was public education rather than truth-seeking. Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique (1835 and 1840), Livre I, Deuxième Partie, Ch. VIII, Du jury aux Etats-Unis considéré comme institution politique. De Tocqueville writes, 'Je ne sais si le jury est utile à ceux qui ont des procès, mais je suis sû r qu'il est très utile à ceux qui les jugent. Je le regarde comme l'un des moyens les plus efficaces dont puisse se servir la société pour l'éducation du peuple'. ('I do not know if the jury is useful for those who have lawsuits, but I am sure it is very useful for those who decide them. I see it as one of the most efficient means by which society can educate the people.') Derived from visits to the United States in 1835 and 1840, these observations speak to early American exceptionalism. See also Oscar Chase, 'American Exceptionalism and Comparative Procedure' (2002) 50 Am J Comp L 277. 43 Perception may be more significant than reality. One study found that in federal civil actions in the United States, foreigners actually fare better than domestic parties. See Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, 'Xenophilia in American Courts' (1996) 109 Harv Law Rev 1122. An explanation for this counter-intuitive finding lies in the fear of litigation bias that leads foreign litigants to settle rather than continue to judgment unless they have particularly strong cases. 44 An exaggerated articulation of this perspective (intentional, for entertainment perhaps) was presented in Jan Paulsson, 'International Arbitration is not Arbitration' (2008) 2 Stockholm Int'l Arb Rev, adapted from Brierley Memorial Lecture, Montréal, 28 May 2008, suggesting that international arbitration is to arbitration what sea elephants are to land elephants. 45 One arbitration followed a $500 million Mississippi verdict against a Canadian company for breach of $980 thousand in burial insurance contracts and an exchange of funeral homes valued at $2.5 million. After a trial with xenophobic comments to inflame jurors and an appeal thwarted by a $625 million bond requirement, the investor alleged discrimination and unfair treatment. 46 Concern is often expressed that civil juries show undue sympathy to the 'little guy' (consumer or employee) against the 'big guy' (manufacturer, bank or boss). mediation, like negotiation, succeeds only if both sides agree to bury differences. 47 If each side clings to peace on its own terms, reference to what the parties (plural) want will be meaningless.
Arbitration, by contrast, imposes a binding decision when harmony proves impossible, and thus implicates a more rigorous process for finding facts and law based on weighing testimony and documents. When differences are deep and complex, the process takes time.
In some instances, the parties may tailor the procedural calculus to reflect protocols different from those by which national law balances speed and economy against the interest in accuracy. However, in disputes with a serious impact on corporate or national welfare, intelligent litigants usually craft their rules with deference to the adage that one person's delay is another's due process. 48 An agreement to end hostilities may cost less than arbitration, just as a train trip from London to Paris is cheaper and quicker than a flight from London to Hong Kong. However, if the parties cannot agree to the shorter trip, they may have no option but to accompany each other on the longer and more costly voyage. In such instance, both will want a pilot who cares about taking the best route to the correct destination. 
Tools for Fact-Finding
A. The Impact of Legal Culture
Although differences in national procedure do exist, 50 most modern legal systems show a core reliance on witness testimony, documentary exhibits and expert opinion. 51 However, this does not mean that they agree on how to use 47 Noting that a decision to arbitrate shifts responsibility to a third party, Judge Schwebel speculates that mediation is rare for investor-state disputes because bureaucracies tend to shift rather than assume responsibility. 49 A more controversial analogy might compare mediation to a dinner date and arbitration to a marriage. The casual date carries no commitment, with the couple free to go separate ways if the chemistry lacks, just as disputants can ignore a mediator's suggestion. In contrast, deeper consequences attach to wedding vows and arbitration agreements, notwithstanding that subsequent annulment requests are possible in each case. Of course, arbitral awards usually look more like divorce decrees than marriage certificates but both carry a degree of somber finality. 50 52 Even radical differences in practice sometimes present themselves as divergent paths to the same end. 53 Under the Anglo-American model, lawyers do the heavy lifting in gathering and marshalling elements of proof, as well as questioning witnesses. Truth reveals itself in the crucible of vigorous exchanges among those with competing perspectives. This so-called 'adversarial' system contrasts with the 'inquisitorial' paradigm in which judges or arbitrators take a more proactive role in finding out what happened.
Much international arbitration implicates some combination of the two approaches.
54 Fact-finding is enhanced by self-interested litigants motivated to ferret out information. Notwithstanding that work falls on those with incentives to ignore some aspects of the story, it would be hard to imagine anyone other than counsel marshalling evidence for arbitration on a global basis.
Yet a more inquisitorial style may commend itself during oral hearings, after party briefs memorialize points of law and evidence. Rather than sitting passively while lawyers perform, arbitrators who engage in robust and direct dialogue with witnesses and counsel can stimulate the mental juices that help connect analytic dots, at least if they avoid seeming to have pre-judged the case, or revealing a failure to read the papers.
What starts as a culture clash might, after adjudicatory skirmishing, end up as legal cross-pollination, evolving into common litigation practice among 54 In some instances, the procedural framework takes on the nature of a juridical language. Juxtaposing two ways to say 'language' in French, Yves Derains makes this point forcefully in P Guach and others (eds) Langue et langages de l'arbitrage (Mélanges en l'Honneur de Pierre Tercier 2008) 789. French might be the tongue (la langue) for communication in an arbitration built on a procedural language (le language) drawn from American practice, such as party-dominated document production and a trial with testimony presented all at once. Words such as 'witness' and 'témoin' may prove false friends if evidence is presented by a party's employee, who might lack the capacity to testify under French legal notions of what it means to present testimony. arbitration practitioners. 55 Much of such intellectual cross-pollination implicates legal practitioners and scholars who serve as worker bees, buzzing from symposium to symposium and from case to case, sharing views on how to resolve disputes, or set standards for testimony, document production and ethics. Notable examples include the work of UNCITRAL on both arbitration rules and a Model Arbitration Law, 56 as well as the International Bar Association instruments on conflicts-of-interest 57 and evidence, 58 and the American College of Commercial Arbitrators compendium of 'Best Practices' for arbitral proceedings. 59 Built on arbitral lore memorialized in treatises and learned papers, the 'soft law' of procedure operates in tandem with the firmer norms imposed by statutes, treaties and institutional rules.
Although nothing prevents litigants from overriding these principles, they usually produce far-reaching effects for the simple reason that post-dispute party agreement proves difficult or impossible. Rightly or wrongly, the guidelines enter the canon of sacred instruments to be cited faute de mieux, to fill gaps in institutional rules and national statutes. 
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Just as international arbitration has been 'Americanized,' arbitration in the United States has to some extent begun to reflect the European emphasis on written testimony and reasoned awards. 65 Perhaps the most striking examples can be found in the new American standard for arbitrator ethics. partisan and thus permitted ex parte communications with their appointers. 67 Ultimately, however, American arbitration came into line with global standards, 68 imposing a presumption of independence for all arbitrators, regardless of how they were selected.
B. Conflict, Convergence and Proportionality
Seeking an illustration of how cultural baselines affect truth-seeking, it would be difficult to find one better than the oft-maligned American style of discovery. 70 Likewise, one would be hard-pressed to suggest a more forceful example of procedural cross-pollination than the compromise reached in guidelines that balance risks and benefits of document requests.
In many countries, lawyers simply provide opposing counsel with advance copies of exhibits on which they intend to rely. Such exchange aims to avoid undue surprise. Conversely, practice in the United States 71 and England 72 has evolved to require parties to produce, either spontaneously or upon request, broad categories of dispute-related material that may be adverse to their 67 In domestic (rather than international) arbitration, it was presumed that arbitrators nominated by one of the parties were partisan unless explicitly agreed otherwise. own case. 73 Like a vacuum cleaner, document production often sucks up bits of paper that may yield information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 74 In this regard, American lawyers often appear to their foreign colleagues as asserting a right to shoot first and aim later, asking how they are to prove a claim without the other side's documents. Continental lawyers reply that evidence should be collected before claims are filed, unless of course they themselves want information to benefit a client, at which point American legal imperialism becomes the 'emerging trend' in arbitration.
A rule that requires the other side to produce documents adverse to its case provides a perspective of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each side's position. This may lead to settlement, sharper definition of issues, and of course enhanced chances that the arbitrator will learn what truly happened. 75 Document production comes at greater expense, however. Some equilibrium must exist between accuracy furthered by document production and the need for sensitivity to its cost in time and money. On a net basis, more exchange is not necessarily better.
In international arbitration, the different cultural starting points have produced an accommodation in which truth-seeking will be tempered against the objectives of speed and economy. The 1999 International Bar Association Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration (IBA Rules of Evidence) adopt a compromise that might be seen as 'rifle shot' rather than 'scatter gun' approach. Requests must identify either a single document or a narrow and specific category of documents, coupled with a description of their relevance and materiality to the outcome of the case. 76 The American Arbitration Association has memorialized an analogous approach with information exchange guidelines that apply in all international cases administered by its affiliate, the International Centre for Dispute Resolution. 74 The origins of this approach derive from the so-called 'Peruvian Guano Test' which fixed the universe of potentially discoverable documents to include whatever might lead to a 'train of inquiry' to advance the party's own case or damage the case of the adversary. Compagnie Financière du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co., 11 QBD 55 (1882). The so-called Woof Reforms that came into effect in 1999 curtail some of the entitlement to documents simply because they lead to a 'train of inquiry' toward evidence. 75 Admittedly, assumptions about what discovery is 'normal' will affect the cost/benefit calculation in determining what is relevant or material. Yet the wind has definitely blown away from both the minimalist and the expansionist approaches, with notions of proportionality informing choices on when burdens of production bear a reasonable relationship to the degree of expected enlightenment.
C. The Role of Complexity
The more complicated a dispute, the more challenging the task of fixing the right case management tools. If Jill claims that Jack sold her a defective automobile, the calculus of truth-seeking rests on testimony from individuals who helped Jill get the car started. But few international disputes pose a single issue with such pristine purity.
So let us imagine a more realistic scenario. The owner of an American fishing fleet claims for lost profits and injury to crew members due to explosion of ship engines purchased from a European manufacturer. As the arbitrator begins to decorticate the controversy, one obvious issue is whether engine failure resulted from poor European workmanship or sloppy American maintenance. What law should determine whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear claims for bodily injury? Should hearings be bifurcated to address the jurisdictional question first? Does contractual limitation of liability cover some claims but not others? What theory determines quantum of damages? How does the arbitrator respond to disagreement on whether briefs should be simultaneous or sequential? How much pretrial document production should be ordered? Should oral depositions be directed for crew members, or subpoenas issued to third parties with information on maintenance? Do claims of attorney-client privilege shield some communications from production? Does privilege depend on whether the document was created in the United States (where communications with in-house counsel may be privileged) or in Switzerland (where such communications are not)? Should experts in areas such as engineering, accounting or damages be heard examined together or separately? 78 In such arbitrations, proper case management requires closer sensitivity to the counterpoise between finding the truth about liability and damages, and avoiding undue cost and delay. The framework for truth-seeking in arbitration must be flexible enough to adapt to a myriad number of problems. Since things that go without saying often will go better having been said, it may be well at 78 Almost any job description might become the subject of expert testimony. In one case involving power plant construction in a developing country, each side called military officers and social workers (including a padre who testified for both sides) to opine on how the contractor should have reacted to guerilla activity that was interfering with work site progress. this point to mark the point by listing a few real world situations that illustrate why arbitral truth-seeking is not always a simple matter.
An owner accuses a building contractor of deviating from good practice in 48 matters, ranging from silicon in the cement mix to termite protection for cables. What truth lies there in these claims? Do they give rise to the contracter's liability? In a corporate acquisition, the seller allegedly misrepresented the transferred entity's income by causing repairs to be capitalized over several years, instead of taken as expenses during the year incurred, thus arguably overstating the entity's Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization. Was the accounting irregular, and if so do buyer have a right to rescind? Pursuant to a long-term supply contract, one side says that the other must adjust the price to account for changed circumstances. Learned professors differ about what the applicable law requires. Which legal expert's report is more accurate? The purchaser of a bank, after taking possession, claims that the loan portfolio is not of the quality promised, and that deposits were less than expected. Is a rebate justified due to impairment of the assets and/or liabilities? An insurance company fails to reimburse a manufacturer for third party liabilities incurred in American tort litigation, suggesting that the company 'knew or expected' that the insured product would cause injury. What did the policy-holder know? A host state expropriates assets of an American oil company. What is the value of the confiscated property? How should quantum of loss be calculated? A buyer of natural gas argues that events of force majeure allow an escape from purchase obligations. What legal standard determines duty to perform?
In arbitrations with an international element, controversy also can arise over the procedurally right way to decide these complex matters. written testimony, 80 document production, 81 electronic discovery 82 or available remedies and damage calculations. 83 
The Truth about Law

A. Jura Novit Curia
Many trees have been felled to make paper for articles on how to find facts, looking at topics from presentation of testimony to the role of depositions and discovery. Less attention has been paid to the arbitrator's truth-seeking function with respect to legal norms. 84 This gap is surprising on several counts. First, arbitral awards are not usually subject to review for legal error in the same way that lower court judgments are scrutinized in a hierarchical national legal system. The New York Arbitration Convention lists nothing like mistake of law as a ground for non-recognition. And the ICSID Convention contains no right to seek annulment for substantive legal error as such. 85 Thus arbitrators bear a heavy burden to 'get it right' on the law, since their mistakes cannot be corrected in an appellate chain. 86 Second, the starting point for determining the applicable law may be problematic for arbitrators. National courts seek authority in choice-of-law principles of their own jurisdiction. By contrast, the genesis of adjudicatory power for international arbitration derives not from any single legal system, but from the parties' decision that a dispute not be decided by national courts.
Consequently, if the parties have left lacunae, arbitrators may need to examine transnational norms elaborated in other arbitrations or in cases from several jurisdictions.
Finally, arbitrators in international cases are prone to listen to testimony from legal experts offered by the parties themselves. Such a practice imposes itself if tribunals include members not trained in the contractually designed law, as well as non-jurists such as engineers, accountants or underwriters.
Even after an applicable law has been determined, the calculus of duty may differ between judge and arbitrator. Judges bear direct obligations to the appointing citizenry, and thus respond to significant societal values that may trump private choices. Although responsible judges (like good scholars) will master existing authority before taking new directions, many traditions allow appellate judges to overrule precedent.
No similar social engineering normally falls to arbitrators. As creatures of consent, arbitrators are law-appliers rather than law-makers, and must show special fidelity to the litigants' shared ex ante expectations as expressed in contract or treaty. 87 Although sensitive to public values, 88 rejecting complicity with illicit schemes 89 and abusive procedures, 90 arbitrators fix their eyes on existing legal norms in determining what the parties had a right to expect.
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Although the realms of fact and law intertwine, 92 distinction remains of profound significance. Controverted facts can remain stubbornly particular, 87 In purely commercial arbitration, the parties' agreement sets expectations. By contrast, for investor-state arbitration expectations derive from treaty commitments to balance investor confidence and host state welfare, with private contracts playing a role through 'umbrella clauses' requiring observance of undertakings. In state-to state arbitration, expectations spring from inter-governmental accords, such as the recent Swiss-Libyan Agreement to resolve tensions from arrest of a Libyan diplomat in Geneva, which instructs arbitrators to apply 'relevant national laws, international conventions, international custom, as well as evidence of general practices accepted as law and the general principles of law and courtesy recognized by civilized nations.' Each side designates a third-country arbitrator, the two of whom chose a chair in default of which the International Court of Justice makes the selection. Agreement between Switzerland and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Tripoli, 20 August 2009. 88 One recollects the dictum in Mitsubishi Motors v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 US 614 (1985), at 638, warning arbitrators to address 'the legitimate interest' in enforcement of public law at the place of enforcement. The contract was governed by Swiss law, but the counterclaim implicated American statutory unfair competition counterclaims. 89 Money laundering presents special temptations. A corrupt official might contract with a foreign entity controlled by accomplices, allowing contract default to lead to an 'award' against the government followed by transfer of money into a bank account abroad. Careful arbitrators look for warning signs of fake arbitrations, including entities not in existence at contract signature. See Gulf Petro Trading Co. v Nigerian National Petroleum Corp., 91 While arbitrators may have less margin to manoeuvre than appellate courts to abandon substantive precedent as outmoded, in procedural matters arbitrators may possess greater options for innovation. With respect to strict rules of evidence or document production, the parties may well want less procedural formality than in court. Such reduced formalism does not mean lack of fundamental fairness, but rather that the arbitrator can provide a measure of bespoke procedural tailoring in response to the litigants' request for a more streamlined process. 92 In Vargas v Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F 2d 838 (2d Cir. 1981), an aviation policy covered accidents 'within the United States of America'. The insured died while travelling between two points of the requiring recourse to witnesses and exhibits, while the law by its nature possesses a generality that permits instruction by reading statutes and cases. 93 This difference between law and fact plays itself out in the maxim jura novit curia: the judge knows the law. 94 When applied by analogy to arbitrators, 95 the principle facilitates discovery of norms to connect specific events with general theories for relief, at least if arbitrators look beyond their prejudices. 96 Of course, the fact that arbitrators may engage in direct study of legal authorities does not mean their award should contain surprises. 97 Providing an opportunity for the litigants to comment on the law remains vital both to the arbitrator getting it right and to the parties' sense of being treated justly. 
B. Transnational Norms
Between Substance and Procedure
On the substantive merits of a dispute, arbitrators in commercial disputes usually apply a legal system chosen by the parties. 99 A privately negotiated commercial loan agreement will recite that it is to be construed according to the law of England, or an insurance policy might state that it shall be interpreted under New York law. By contrast, an expropriation claim will be decided under the terms of a bilateral investment treaty in addition to whatever other principles of international law might be found relevant.
100
By contrast, for matters of pure procedure such as briefing schedules or time allocation at hearings, arbitrators are generally expected to exercise wide discretion. 101 Aside from treating the parties fairly, arbitrators usually fill procedural interstices by recourse to their experience and guidelines gleaned from general practice.
102
With respect to a third category, questions that contain elements of both substance and procedure, arbitrators often look to transnational norms of a less flexible sort, synthesized from various cases and awards. Even if no single fixed legal system applies, the parties expect discretion to play a lesser role. Such hybrid matters, where firmer norms apply, include rates of interest, currency for awards, standards for determining arbitrator bias, 103 the propriety of 101 This is not to say that parties never provide specific guidance on procedural matters. Indeed, both French and Swiss statutes explicitly allow choice of procedural law (French NCPC, Article 1494, Swiss LDIP Article 182) as does UNCITRAL Model Article 19. Moreover, it is increasingly common to see contracts make reference to the 1999 IBA Rules of Evidence.
102 Notions of fairness may differ, of course. In one London arbitration the arbitrator refused a right of reply to the claimant, which then challenged the award for procedural irregularity. The judge upheld the award on the basis that nothing in the arbitration's procedural framework said who got to speak last, and the English rule, giving final word to claimants bearing the burden of proof, did not apply in arbitration. After punting the question to the arbitrator, the judge also noted that international arbitration normally follows a right to make an equal number of submissions, which thus created an established practice that accorded with the arbitrator's ruling. Margulead Ltd. 
The Arbitrator as Synthesizer
In the juridical twilight between procedure and substance, two problems illustrate why and how arbitrators engage in legal synthesis. One relates to joinder of non-signatories, as when a parent corporation is alleged to have agreed to arbitrate through the agency of a subsidiary. The other implicates claims of lawyer/client privilege in the face of document production requests. In each instance, arbitrators who care about accuracy and fairness may need to synthesize transnational norms from several legal systems that inform their decision.
a. Non-Signatories and Implied Consent Sometimes a claimant seeks the deeper financial resources of the respondent's parent company, even though the shareholder never signed the arbitration clause. For example, a French company might allege that the shareholder of its American counterparty had implicitly agreement to arbitrate through behaviour evidencing the agency of its subsidiary. Or, a respondent parent might invoke an arbitration clause signed by its subsidiary to avoid an alternate forum perceived as unfavourable. When arguments for joinder rest on implied consent, the arbitrator's job of determining an applicable law to decide the matter may not be simple.
107
While judges understandably start from the law of whatever forum pays their salary, arbitrators find the genesis of their power in private decisions.
Traditional approaches include the law of the contract and the law of the arbitral situs. 108 Yet both may involve a circular exercise that presumes its conclusion when identification of who agreed to arbitrate constitutes the very question to be decided. The contract's applicable law, and the law of the arbitral seat, will be foreign to an entity that remained a stranger to the transaction. The arbitrator thus confronts a dilemma not unlike that of the proverbial chicken and egg, and must be wary of starting with a law derived solely from one side's version of the disputed facts.
For these reasons, arbitrators often seek guidance in transnational norms articulated by scholars and in published awards. Such norms address the circumstances under which an arbitration clause might be extended to a non-signatory, for example, by virtue of the parent company's behaviour in negotiations and contract formation, or performance of related contracts which form part of a single contract scheme constituted by multiple agreements.
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Such transnational norms often serve as the best indicator of the reasonable expectations of litigants from diverse legal cultures. They apply for want of any better way to promote fair dispute resolution in a global community where not all accept one national law.
b. Lawyer-Client Privilege
The confidentiality of lawyer-client communications serves as another illustration of why and how arbitrators synthesize legal norms in transnational cases. 110 Although professional secrecy exists in many legal systems, 111 the lawyer-client relationship takes on a special importance in disputes that implicate 'common law' procedures. If a party may be compelled to produce documents adverse to its case, privilege becomes one escape hatch from the other side's prying eyes. 112 about it. Thus in practice, arbitrators might look to judicial authorities from various common law jurisdictions, including perhaps persuasive authority from Australia, New Zealand or Canada, as well as England and the United States. Such is the essence of synthesis, which like other forms of truth-seeking will inevitably require some investment in time and effort on the part of counsel and arbitrators.
C. Prior Awards
The effect of prior awards in other cases also affects the way arbitrators seek legal accuracy. Absent res judicata or issue preclusion arising for the same parties and the same claims or issues, 121 arbitrators do not usually deem themselves bound by rulings of other tribunals, at least not in the way judges feel constrained by decisions of superior courts in a unified and hierarchical national system.
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This does not mean that prior awards will be ignored. To the contrary, decisions of other arbitral tribunals often get taken into account as constituting a corpus of principles representing the litigants' shared expectations. While not given the status of precedent in a narrow common law sense, awards of respected arbitrators may bolster support for results in other cases, 123 providing information about what the relevant community considers the right approach to similar problems. 124 For litigants, this information can serve as a tool of persuasion. For business managers and government planners, it provides one way to predict how future disputes will be resolved. 125 And for 121 While res judicata prevents the same parties from re-litigating the same cause of action after it has already been adjudicated in an earlier lawsuit, notions of issue preclusion come into play when a second but different lawsuit implicates questions decided in a prior action, the re-litigation of which questions is then barred. French doctrines of force de chose jugée and German concepts of rechtskräftiges Urteil play roles similar to those of res judicata in the common law tradition.
122 Within a single jurisdiction, a measure of uniformity can be imposed from the top down so that one case furnishes authority for decisions in similar fact patterns with similar questions of law. In theory, Continental and 'common law' traditions take different views of precedent. Article 5, French Code civil, forbids judges from purporting to make general rules: Il est défendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de disposition générale et réglementaire sur les causes qui leur sont soumises. In practice, however, the difference between traditions may not be so great. See generally, Denis Tallon, 'Précedent' in Dictionnaire de la culture juridique (2003) 1185-7. Still, common law emphasis on the difference between 'holding' and 'dictum' in a case may not be shared in all traditions, with some Continental jurists reading decisions of their highest courts as if they were legislative texts. 123 One authority has suggested that for international arbitration precedent exists as 'decisional authority that may reasonably serve to justify the arbitrators' decision to the principal audience for that decision'. Barton Legum, 'Definitions of Precedent in International Arbitration' in E Gaillard and Y Banifatemi (eds) Precedent in International Arbitration 5, 14.
124 For an illustration of the delicate ambivalence arbitrators feel about prior awards, see ICSID Case No ARB/02/17 AES Corporation v the Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction of 13 July 2005, at paragraph 30, which asserts that each arbitral tribunal 'remains sovereign and may retain, as it is confirmed by ICSID practice, a different solution for resolving the same problem....' Following a semicolon, the sentence then adds that decisions 'dealing with the same or very similar issues may at least indicate some lines of reasoning of real interest; this Tribunal may consider them in order to compare its own position with those already adopted by its predecessors and, if it shares the views already expressed by one or more of these tribunals on a specific point of law, it is free to adopt the same solution.' Ibid 11. 125 One ICSID ad hoc committee has suggested that arbitral tribunals bear responsibility for creating 'une jurisprudence constante' (coherent and consistent body of case law) in the field of international investment law. the arbitrators, prior rulings can justify awards to the rest of the world and enhance the prospect that similar cases will be treated similarly. 126 
D. Amiable Composition
In some circumstances litigants authorize arbitrators to disregard the strict rigors of otherwise applicable law, and decide in a way that the arbitrators deem fair and equitable. 127 Drawn from French law, amiable composition describes a process whereby arbitrators temper legal rules whose strict application violates what seems right in the circumstances. 128 Common examples include adjustment of payment due to substantial completion of a project, price changes due to alternation in the fundamental economic balance between the parties, and adjustment of terms in the event of unexpected inflation or exchange rate modification. 129 In stipulating to amiable composition, parties tell arbitrators to pursue a different sort of truth. Rather than aiming at legal accuracy, the arbitrators reach toward general notions of 'right' encrusted with emotional overtones and sometimes in tension with court decisions, statutes or strict contract terms. 130 A long-standing debate surrounds whether amiable composition amounts to the same thing as decision-making ex aequo et bono, according to the 'right and good'. 131 While the two notions are often used interchangeably, they may not be coextensive in all minds. Arbitrators who decide ex aequo et bono normally begin and end with a private sense of justice, going directly to a personal view of the right result. With amiable composition another option would present itself, directing arbitrators to start at rules of law, but depart only if needed to achieve a just result. 132 The difference is significant, given that there is nothing inherently unjust bout most norms of commercial law.
With respect to the substance of economic transactions, such as a seller's right to be paid or the insured's right to be reimbursed, the slim objective content of notions such as fairness (if divorced from legal norms) makes the concept problematic.
133 Inherently chameleon-like, changing colour depending on background and perspective, ad hoc fairness that ignores legal rules risks reducing the information with which companies and governments evaluate risks and make choices. Nor will concepts of substantive fairness long satisfy the public interest in the stable economic environment that obtains when claims and defences in one case are treated like those advanced in similar disputes subject to similar norms. 134 Only an explicit mandate normally justifies an arbitrator's shift from a search for legal truth to the pursuit of subjective fairness.
From Oracle to Evidence
The Yale University seal bears an open book with two Hebrew words transliterated Urim and Thummim. Sometimes rendered 'light and truth ', 135 this Biblical expression designates a truth-seeking oracle, perhaps precious disparate base lines. Even if universally accepted standards remain elusive, however, some prove more workable than others.
In the search for creative case management tools, award accuracy remains the lodestar. Efficiency without accuracy will prove an empty prize. Until the world evolves to the point where people abandon attempts to vindicate rights, some market will exist for a mechanism that emphasizes deciding legal claims correctly by determining what happened, what was agreed and what the law provides. If simple peace-making were to become the norm, arbitration as a truth-seeking process would need to be reinvented.
